ORIGIN OF THE DEBATE
Value is satisfaction attained/experienced through the use of means (consumption). Consumers acquire goods for their expected value; purchases are based on their ranking of alternatives. Those alternatives are produced by entrepreneurs speculating on the value they facilitate.
MY COMMENT
I'm going to disagree with the 1st part. If value were the satisfaction experienced through the use, value would be ex post. And yet, value precedes the action. So we acquire goods for the value we attribute to them at a given moment, not for the expected value. Don't you think?
BYLUND'S RESPONSE https://x.com/Joel_Serrano_M_/status/1945372054007538093
No, value (the promise thereof) motivates action, but action precedes (realized) value.
MY COMMENT
There is no such thing as realized value. There is the end achieved. Value is prior; it is unrelated to the actual final result of the action. Evidently, when the expected end is not achieved, the value attributed to a good changes.
AARON SEPULVEDA ENTERS THE DEBATE https://x.com/AaronSepulvedaC/status/1951058367176155395
Wait, if there's expect marginal utility (expected value), why can't there be realized value (realized marginal utility)?
MY ANSWER
Utility and value are not the same thing. In human action, means are considered useful for achieving ends. And ends are valued. Of course, the utility of the means is closely related to the value given to the end. The higher the valuation of the end, the greater the utility is given to the means that achieve it. Once the end is achieved, it may disappoint us (fail to satisfy us). And we may stop considering it an end. In that case, the good may be adequate to achieve the initial goal, but since this initial goal is no longer an end for us (we have stopped valuing it), we will no longer attribute utility to the good (we stopped considering it useful).
COMMENTARY BY AARON SEPULVEDA https://x.com/AaronSepulvedaC/status/1951301273883423020
Not really, you can value backwards
Marginal utility will be X*, then when the action ended, you value what happened through introspection afterwards.
*this being a sensation, not a number, obviously
MY REPLY TO THIS LAST COMMENT
(I don't write it in X because it's a bit long)
I agree that we can reflect on our experiences post-action, but this does not imply the existence of a "realized value" or a "realized marginal utility" in the sense you suggest, and I would like to explain why, from the perspective of human action. In the Austrian School, marginal utility refers to the expected satisfaction that guides our decisions before acting. For example, when you choose to eat a cake, you do so because you like it, i.e., you anticipate a sensation of pleasure (your "X"). This expected marginal utility manifests itself at the moment of choice, not afterward. Once you eat the cake, the action has already occurred, and the (subjective) utility was expressed in your decision.
Introspection does not create realized utility. It is true that you can reflect afterward and say "the cake was more or less satisfactory than I expected." But this introspection is a new subjective evaluation, not a "realized marginal utility." The sensation you describe when valuing backward is not the same utility that led you to act; it is a subsequent judgment that may influence future decisions, but not a fixed or measurable value that is "realized" upon concluding the action.
Utility and value are subjective and dynamic. As I mentioned before, the utility of a means (the cake) depends on the value we assign to the end (enjoying eating it). If the cake disappoints you, the end loses value, and the means ceases to be useful for future ends. Your introspection may confirm that disappointment, but it does not generate a separable "realized value"; it simply adjusts your subjective preferences. Utility is not "realized" as a concrete result because it remains a subjective perception, not a quantifiable object, even as a sensation.
Difference with "realized value." The idea of a "realized value" implies that post-action satisfaction is a defined result that we can isolate. But in human action, value and utility are always prospective (tied to choice) and subjective. Reflecting on a sensation does not create a retrospective marginal utility; it creates a new valuation that affects how you will act later.
In short, although we can reflect on our sensations after an action, this does not constitute a "realized marginal utility" or a "realized value." Marginal utility is a concept tied to the expectation that drives action, and subsequent introspection is simply a new act of subjective valuation, not an objective realization of value.